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INTRODUCTION 
No matter what your mother says, it is not always better to give than to 
receive.  Opinion letters are concrete proof.  Opinion letters ―provide[ ] the opinion 
recipient with the opinion giver‘s professional judgment about how the highest court 
of the jurisdiction whose law is being addressed would appropriately resolve the 
issues covered by the opinion on the date of the opinion letter.‖1  Parties to business 
transactions commonly require counsel for the opposing party to opine on ―1) the 
‗authority‘ of [their client] to engage in the transaction, 2) the enforceability of the 
transaction contracts against [their client], and 3) [whether] the transaction [or their 
client] is . . . in violation of any applicable law or contract.‖2  Although opinion 
letters have long been routine in business transactions,3 preparing an opinion letter 
can still bring anxiety to the hearts of even the most experienced lawyers.4  This 
anxiety stems from the liability that an opinion letter can bring upon the issuing 
counsel.5   
                                                 
* B.A. Spelman College 2005; J.D. The University of Tennessee College of Law 2008.  Lillian 
Blackshear is an associate in the Commercial Transactions and Real Estate practice group in the 
Nashville office of Bass, Berry & Sims PLC.  The author thanks Professor Robert M. Lloyd for his 
guidance and support. 
1 TriBar Opinion Committee, Third-Party “Closing” Opinions, 53 BUS. LAW. 592, 595-96 (1998) 
(emphasis omitted). 
2 Jonathan C. Lipson, Price, Path, & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A 
Preliminary Investigation), 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 59, 62 (2005) (discussing the most popular form of 
opinion letters, the third-party closing opinion). 
3 See id.; Donald W. Glazer, It’s Time to Streamline Opinion Letters: The Chair of a BLS Committee Speaks 
Out, BUS. LAW TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 32, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/9-
2opinion.html (discussing the history of opinion letters).  
4 See Lipson, supra note 2, at 61 (when issuing opinions, ―lawyers conduct themselves as if their 
professional lives were on the line‖). 
5 See id. at 65, 107. 
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Generally, there are two types of opinions: first-party opinions and third-
party opinions.6  A first-party opinion is delivered by an attorney to a client upon the 
client‘s request for the lawyer‘s professional judgment on an issue.7  As its name 
implies, a third-party opinion is delivered by an attorney to a non-client on a client‘s 
behalf.8  Business parties often demand third-party opinions from opposing counsel 
as part of due diligence in completing a transaction.9  The TriBar Opinion 
Committee describes some common situations in which opinion letters are used: 
The relevant agreement in a business transaction will often provide 
for delivery of an opinion letter as a condition of closing.  In some 
cases, such as a loan, the borrower will furnish an opinion letter of its 
counsel to the lender.  In other cases, such as in some mergers, each 
side will furnish an opinion letter of its counsel to the other side.10   
Third-party opinions are used by recipients to help ensure that the other party to the 
transaction has fulfilled its legal obligations and that there are not any relevant legal 
issues of which the recipient is unaware.11  Third-party opinions ―are viewed as a 
‗fixture of the American legal scene,‘ and are routinely delivered in financings, 
mergers and acquisitions, stock issuances, and other large, complex transactions.‖12 
While opinion letters are a routine part of business transactions,13 lawyers 
issuing opinion letters should not take the task lightly.14  Lawyers can be and have 
                                                 
6 See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
9 (2005). 
7 See Lipson, supra note 2, at 116 n.294. 
8 See id. at 61-62; TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 596; Committee on Legal Opinions, 
Third-Party Legal Opinion Report, Including the Legal Opinion Accord, of the Section of Business Law, American 
Bar Association, 47 BUS. LAW. 167, 169 (1991).  
9 Lipson, supra note 2, at 71 (citing Committee on Legal Opinions, Guidelines for the Preparation of Closing 
Opinions, 57 BUS. LAW. 875, 875 (2002)). 
10 TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 596. 
11 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 10-11 (―[T]he inability of counsel to deliver a requested opinion at closing 
signals a problem and allows intended opinion recipients to refuse to consummate the transaction.‖); 
see Committee on Legal Opinions, Guidelines for the Preparation of Closing Opinions, 57 BUS. LAW. 875, 875 
(2002). 
12 Lipson, supra note 2, at 62.  ―Because the transactions requiring third-party legal opinions span the 
entire range of business and financial undertakings, such opinions have become far more prevalent 
than opinions directed to clients.‖  Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 9. 
13 See supra text accompanying notes 10-12; Lipson, supra note 1, at 80. 
2008]  WAIT… WHAT DID I JUST SAY? 73 
 
 
been sued by third parties for false or misleading statements contained in opinion 
letters.15  In fact, many lawyers perceive this risk of liability to be increasing.16  In a 
study conducted by Professor Jonathan C. Lipson, ―[m]any of the lawyers 
interviewed . . . said that they thought that lawyers were becoming increasingly 
attractive litigation targets when transactions failed, and that opinion letters would 
form an important link in the chain leading to liability.‖17 
Complicating matters, there is little case law governing tort liability arising 
from false or misleading opinion letters.18  There is also a lack of academic literature 
on the subject, despite the prevalence of opinion letters.19  Other than sporadic case 
law and reports from state bar associations, the only major resources on third-party 
opinions are an article written by the TriBar Opinion Committee,20 two articles 
written by the American Bar Association‘s Section of Business Law,21 two sections in 
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers,22 two sections in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts,23 Model Rule of Professional Conduct 2.3,24 and a 
treatise by Arthur Norman Field and Jeffrey M. Smith.25   
                                                                                                                                     
14 Id. at 102 (―[L]awyers express increasing anxiety about liability for their opinion letters, and find 
support for this concern in recent decisions.‖); see Joseph S. Berman, Attorney Opinion Letters, BOSTON 
B.J., Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 20. 
15 Berman, supra note 14, at 20; see Lipson, supra note 2, at 102-09. 
16 Lipson, supra note 2, at 65, 102. 
17 Id. at 65. 
18 See id. at 102-05.  See generally Berman, supra note 14 (analyzing two seemingly contradictory 
Massachusetts cases). 
19 Lipson, supra note 2, at 61 (―Few practices among U.S. lawyers are more curious—or (curiously) less 
studied by legal scholars.‖); Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 12 (The relevant scholarly literature is . . . 
sparse.‖). 
20 TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 592. 
21 Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11; Committee on Legal Opinions, Legal Opinion Principles, 
53 BUS. LAW. 831 (1998). 
22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 51, 95 (2000). 
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 
(1977).  
24 MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.3 (2002). 
25 ARTHUR NORMAN FIELD & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL OPINIONS IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2d 
ed. 2007).  
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There may be a couple of reasons why there is not highly developed case law 
or an extensive amount of scholarly research on third party-opinions.  It may be that 
most cases against lawyers over faulty opinion letters are settled.  Alternatively, there 
may not be many of such cases filed.26  Whatever the reason for the dearth of case 
law and research on the issue, lawyers are still fearful of potential liability, and many 
predict that attorney liability will only increase in the future.27   
Perhaps even more troubling than the scarcity of case law, existing case law 
on opinion letter liability is sometimes contradictory.28  For example, in April of 
2004, one Massachusetts state trial court held that an attorney did not owe a duty of 
care to a recipient of a third-party opinion letter because that duty conflicted with 
obligations to his client.29  In December of 2004, under similar facts, another 
Massachusetts state trial court held that an attorney does owe the recipient of a third-
party opinion letter a duty of care because the recipient is entitled to rely on the 
opinion.30  Thus, even when relevant authority exists, it does not always provide clear 
guidance.  This Article endeavors to synthesize the lessons from existing case law; 
report the trends in opinion letter liability as documented in case law, bar reports, 
and scholarly articles; and use those resources to provide guidelines to help lawyers 
avoid liability.  The law on opinion letters is unsettled,31 but it is possible to discern a 
few general rules and to identify some situations where lawyers should explicitly 
protect themselves from potential liability. 
Part I of this Article discusses the scope of an opinion letter and how and 
why opining counsel must define this scope to lessen their chances of liability.  Part 
II examines the complexities lawyers face when the law that is the subject of the 
opinion is unclear or likely to change and suggests how lawyers may safely issue an 
                                                 
26 See Lipson, supra note 2, at 104-06.  ―Many of the lawyers interviewed for this project acknowledged 
that they personally knew of no lawyers who had been sued for errors in a third-party closing opinion 
and held liable (or settled for more than nominal damages) . . . ‗[o]pinion issues represent a very, very 
small number‘ of malpractice claims.‖  Id. 
27 Id. at 105 (―[T]he fact that there aren‘t a lot of cases to hold lawyers liable and there isn‘t a lot of 
experience of lawyers being sued, doesn‘t mean that people aren‘t fearful of it nevertheless.‖); see supra 
text accompanying note 17. 
28 See Lipson, supra note 2, at 84; supra text accompanying note 18. 
29 Nat‘l Bank of Can. v. Hale & Dorr, LLP, No. 2000000296, 2004 WL 1049072 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Apr. 
28, 2004); see Berman, supra note 14, at 22. 
30 Dean Foods Co. v. Pappathanasi, No. Civ. A. 01-2595 BLS, 2004 WL 3019442 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Dec. 
3, 2004); see Berman, supra note 14, at 20-21.  
31 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19, 28-30. 
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opinion under those circumstances.  Part III lists some subjective terms and phrases 
that are commonly used in opinion letters, explains what issues arise when these 
terms and phrases are used, and offers ways for lawyers to avoid litigation.  Finally, 
Part IV explores whether opining counsel owes a duty of care or disclosure to third-
party opinion recipients.  
I.  SCOPE OF THE OPINION LETTER 
One of the most basic concerns for opinion-giving counsel should be the 
scope of the opinion letter.32  A lawyer issuing an opinion should be keenly aware of 
what bodies of law are covered by the opinion letter, as those laws define the scope 
of the lawyer‘s professional judgment on the issues and will be used to determine 
whether that judgment was proper.33  The scope of an opinion letter may be 
different, however, if the opinion has adopted the Legal Opinion Accord 
(―Accord‖).34  To decrease the risk of liability for an opinion letter, opining counsel 
must carefully define the scope of the opinion and understand how the scope may 
change if the opinion adopts the Accord. 
A.  Non-Accord Opinions 
In Day v. Dorsey & Whitney,35 plaintiffs sued a law firm and one of its partners 
for legal malpractice, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and 
consumer fraud resulting from a third-party opinion letter.36  The parties disputed 
the areas of law that the firm agreed to cover in the opinion letter.37  Plaintiffs 
contracted to buy stock in a subsidiary of the firm‘s client, a gaming corporation.38  
As a condition to consummation of the deal, plaintiffs required counsel for the 
gaming corporation to issue an opinion as to the validity of both the stock purchase 
                                                 
32 See TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 597 (―Opinions are often subject to qualifications, 
some stated and some not.‖). 
33 See FIELD & SMITH, supra note 25, at § 3.7; TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 597. 
34 See infra text accompanying notes 68-72 (discussing the meaning and effect of the Accord). 
35 No. 98-1425, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26149 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2001), aff’d, 21 F.App‘x 530 (8th Cir. 
2001). 
36 Id. at *1. 
37 Id. at *5-*6, *20. 
38 Id. at *2. 
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and the gaming corporation‘s operations under securities law and Indian gaming 
law.39   
The law firm believed it had been retained solely to address questions 
concerning securities law, despite the fact that the firm actually had an Indian gaming 
practice group.40  In the engagement letter between the firm and the gaming 
corporation, the corporation requested that the firm ―pay[ ] especially close attention 
to the securities related issues, as [the corporation was] frankly not very 
knowledgeable to the securities area.‖41  The court stated that ―the letter appears to 
limit [the firm‘s] representation . . . to securities-related issues . . . .‖42  The plaintiffs 
claimed, however, that the firm ―had an obligation to review Indian gaming matters 
as they arose in [its] representation of [the gaming corporation] and to adequately 
address those issues in [its] opinion letter.‖43  The gaming corporation gave 
conflicting signals concerning the scope of the firm‘s representation, with one 
executive officer testifying that he did not specifically direct the firm to research or 
not to research Indian gaming law.44 
The plaintiffs based their suit on one false representation in the opinion 
letter.45  The firm had opined in the letter that ―we knew of no material failure by the 
[gaming corporation] to (i) comply with any laws, regulations and orders applicable 
to its business . . . or (iii) comply with any state or federal judgment, decree, order, 
statute, rule or regulation applicable to or binding upon the [gaming corporation].‖46  
In fact, the corporation was (allegedly) in violation of federal Indian gaming law, and 
federal agents raided the corporation‘s offices, seizing company records, books, and 
computer equipment.47  The plaintiffs claimed that the failure of the subsidiary and 
                                                 
39 See id. at *5. 
40 Id. at *5-*6. 
41 Id. at *5. 
42 Id. at *5-*6. 
43 Id. at *6. 
44 Id. at *7 n.4. 
45 Id. at *11-*12. 
46 Id. at *9. 
47 Id. at *11. 
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the subsequent loss of their investments resulted due to public disclosure of the 
gaming corporation‘s alleged violations of federal law.48 
The court granted the defendants‘ motion for summary judgment, holding as 
a matter of law that plaintiffs‘ reliance on the opinion letter was unreasonable and 
that any alleged misrepresentations in the opinion letter did not proximately cause 
the investment loss.49  Thus, the court never reached whether the scope of the firm‘s 
representation included Indian gaming law.50  The court hinted at the result, 
however, by calling plaintiff‘s claim that the representation included Indian gaming 
law ―questionable.‖51  In addition, the court noted that the engagement letter 
between the firm and corporation seemed to limit the firm‘s representation to 
securities law.52   
The court further stated that ―[a]s legal representative for the investors in this 
transaction, [the lead plaintiff, who was both an investor and the attorney for the 
investors] had the unique opportunity to negotiate statements from [the] defendants 
that [the gaming corporation‘s] operations were in full compliance with federal 
Indian gaming laws,‖ as opposed to just ―applicable laws.‖53  The court found the 
plaintiffs‘ failure to avail themselves of this opportunity to be especially conspicuous 
given that plaintiffs had negotiated an opinion letter from another lawyer that did 
contain those affirmative representations.54  The court‘s analysis could indicate that 
the term ―applicable laws‖ is not as broad as it may seem, although the court 
assumed for purposes of the summary judgment motion that the opinion covered 
Indian gaming law.55  Thus, while it is plausible that an opinion covering ―applicable 
laws‖ would indeed cover applicable Indian gaming laws, the court‘s language 
suggests that the phrase ―applicable laws‖ might not cover all laws that would seem 
to be applicable—especially if another opinion letter in the same transaction 
specifically addressed certain applicable bodies of law.56  The court highlighted the 
                                                 
48 Id.  
49 Id. at *24, *30. 
50 Id. at *20 n.10.   
51 Id. 
52 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
53 Day, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26149 at *22-*23. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at *22-*23, *20 n.10. 
56 See id. at *22-*23. 
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limitations of the firm‘s opinion letter, declaring that it ―only provides a negative 
assurance, limited to [the firm‘s] knowledge, that [it] ‗know[s] of no material failure 
by [the gaming corporation] to comply . . . with applicable laws . . . and state and 
federal statutes.‘‖57  The plaintiffs‘ failure ―to negotiate affirmative assurances from 
[the firm] concerning [the gaming corporation]‘s compliance with federal Indian 
gaming laws‖ was one reason the court found the plaintiffs‘ reliance on the opinion 
letter to be unreasonable as a matter of law.58 
If the Day case had not ended with summary judgment, it seems likely that 
the court would have determined that the firm‘s representation did not extend to 
Indian gaming law and, thus, there was no false representation of compliance with 
Indian gaming laws in the opinion.59  The firm and the attorney may have avoided 
litigation altogether, however, by explicitly providing in the opinion letter what 
bodies of law the opinion did and did not cover.60  If the opinion letter specifically 
provided that it only applied to securities law or that it did not apply to Indian 
gaming law, any claim that the opinion was false or misleading in regards to Indian 
gaming law would obviously fail.  To avoid liability, third-party opinions should 
include a provision ―that states what law is covered by the closing opinion.‖61  Such 
provisions are ―strictly construed to exclude responsibility for any other law.‖62 
The opinion letter at issue in Day did include a provision stating that it was 
―limited ‗to the laws of the State of Minnesota, the Delaware General Corporation 
Law, and the federal laws of the United States of America.‘‖63  It did not, however, 
state what federal laws did not apply.  The firm could have prevented the lawsuit by 
simply (1) informing the plaintiffs that the opinion letter would not address Indian 
gaming law64 and (2) stating in the opinion letter that the opinion was applicable only 
                                                 
57 Id. at *23. 
58 Id. at *24 (―[T]he Court finds that under the facts and circumstances of this case—the opinion 
letter‘s disclosures, plaintiffs‘ access to the relevant information and Day‘s ability, as legal 
representative, to negotiate affirmative assurances from defendants concerning [the gaming 
corporation]‘s compliance with federal Indian gaming laws—plaintiffs‘ reliance was unreasonable as a 
matter of law.‖); see infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Day case. 
59 See supra text accompanying note 50. 
60 See FIELD & SMITH, supra note 25, at § 3.7. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Day, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26149 at *8. 
64 Normally, the opinion recipient will tell issuing counsel what law should be covered in the opinion.  
See Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 10, at 215-16 (―To avoid misunderstandings, the 
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to securities law matters and that it ―express[ed] no opinion with respect to [any 
other] matters.‖65  
B.  Accord Opinions 
If an opinion letter has adopted the Accord, it is generally much easier to 
define the scope of the opinion.66  The Accord is a collection of various assumptions, 
limitations, and interpretations that governs all opinions that adopt it.67  It was 
promulgated by the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association in 1991 
as a way for opining counsel to standardize opinion letters and incorporate many of 
the customary assumptions and limitations in their opinions implicitly.68  Developed 
in response to the confusion that plagued opinion givers and recipients over the 
meaning of opinion provisions, the Accord is ―a detailed set of rules that define[ ] for 
those who [choose] to adopt them how an opinion letter should be interpreted, the 
laws it should be understood to cover, the factual investigation the opinion giver [is] 
expected to conduct and the meaning of several standard opinion clauses.‖69 
Adopting the Accord would generally prevent the questions present in Day 
concerning the scope of an opinion letter.70  Section 18 of the Accord provides that 
an opinion that adopts it ―deals only with the specific legal issues it explicitly 
addresses.‖71  Section 19 states that an adopting opinion ―does not address any of the 
following legal issues unless the Opinion Giver has explicitly addressed the specific 
legal issue in the Opinion Letter.‖72  Section 19 then lists eighteen different types of 
                                                                                                                                     
Opinion Recipient is expected to specify to the Opinion Giver, in reasonable detail, the legal issues 
that the Opinion Recipient desires be addressed.‖).  If issuing counsel does not plan to address any of 
the issues requested by recipient, it should so state.  See id. 
65 Id. at 221.   
66 See In re Infocure Securities Litigation, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2002). 
67 Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 170. 
68 See Infocure, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1356; Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, 169.  
69 See Glazer, supra note 3, at 34.  Although the Accord was created as a way to bring uniformity to 
opinion letter interpretation, adoption in opinions is not common.  As noted by Glazer, ―[t]he Accord 
never caught on in major financial centers.‖  Id. 
70 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
71 Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 214. 
72 Id. at 215-16. 
80 TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 10 
 
 
legal issues from federal securities law to federal and state labor laws and 
regulations.73 
In In re Infocure Securities Litigation, plaintiffs attempted to bolster their claims 
of securities fraud and breach of contract by arguing that an opinion letter from 
opposing counsel addressed securities law.74  Because the opinion letter adopted the 
Accord, however, it was clear that securities law was beyond the scope of the 
opinion.75  The court declared that ―an [o]pinion [l]etter subject to the ABA Accord 
contains many limitations on its scope‖ and that the letter at issue ―does not relate to 
[a corporation‘s] overall compliance with securities laws.‖76  The court also stated 
that such an opinion letter ―simply confines itself to the execution of the transaction 
documents and the obligations thereunder.‖77 
II.  WHEN THE LAW IS UNCLEAR OR SUBJECT TO CHANGE 
Opinion-issuing counsel may be concerned when the law at issue is unclear 
or subject to change.  Lawyers are often asked to issue an opinion regarding well-
established law, but are sometimes asked to give an opinion regarding law that is 
either ambiguous or in a state of flux.78  While some lawyers may elect to forgo 
issuing opinions in such situations,79 opinions are often still required to close the 
deals. 
A lawyer‘s representations (1) that her client and the transaction at issue do 
not violate the law and (2) that the transaction is enforceable under applicable law are 
based on the lawyer‘s perception of the current state of the law.  If the law cannot be 
accurately perceived or is likely to change after the opinion has been issued, a ―no 
                                                 
73 Id. 
74 In re Infocure Securities Litigation, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1335, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2002). 
75 Id. at 1358. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. 
78 See generally Day v. Dorsey & Whitney, No. 98-1425, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26149 (D. Minn. Feb. 
21, 2001), aff’d, 21 F.App‘x 530 (8th Cir. 2001) (law allegedly covered by the opinion letter was unclear 
at the time of issuance). 
79 There is an argument that it would be unfair to ask lawyers to give a legal opinion in this situation.  
The American Bar Association‘s Committee on Legal Opinion‘s ―Golden Rule‖ is that ―[a]n opinion 
giver should not be asked to render an opinion that counsel for the opinion recipient would not 
render if it were the opinion giver and possessed the requisite expertise.‖  Committee on Legal 
Opinions, supra note 11, at 878. 
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violation‖ or ―enforceability‖ opinion may be inaccurate.  Of course, because lawyers 
are not expected to possess psychic qualities, they are not required to accurately 
predict the future state of the law.  According to the American Bar Association‘s 
Committee on Legal Opinions, both Accord and non-Accord opinion letters ―speak[ 
] as of [their] date.  An opinion giver has no obligation to update an opinion letter 
for subsequent events or legal developments.‖80  Thus, the problem is not that the 
law is uncertain or likely to change; the real problem is how to issue such an opinion.  
As is often the case, honesty is the best policy. 
In Day v. Dorsey & Whitney, the firm‘s opinion that the corporation complied 
with all applicable laws was subject to an exception provided in an exhibit of the 
agreement.81  Exhibit B included any matters that could cause the corporation to be 
in violation of an applicable law.82  Although the law firm did not consider its 
opinion to include Indian gaming law, Exhibit B disclosed that the corporation‘s 
Indian gaming operations could contravene the law in some states.83  At the time of 
issuance, the legality of the corporation‘s operations under Indian gaming law, 
though supposed, was unclear.84  Exhibit B provided a relevant Supreme Court case 
and federal statute that indicated the probable legality of the gaming operations but 
cautioned that the corporation‘s operations could still be halted by state action.85 
In addition to the information in Exhibit B, plaintiffs also received a letter 
from one of the corporation‘s executive officers and the corporation‘s Form 10-K.  
Both stated the possibility that the corporation‘s gaming operations could violate the 
law.86  Even though the opinion indicated that the gaming operations were probably 
free from legal challenge under Supreme Court case law, the disclosure of possible 
invalidity prevented a reasonable reliance on that opinion.87  Importantly, the court 
found that the opinion letter disclosures were relevant to the firm‘s avoidance of 
                                                 
80 Id.; see Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 8, at 196 (―The Opinion Giver has no obligation to 
advise the Opinion Recipient (or any third party) of changes of law or fact that occur after the date of 
the Opinion Letter—even though the change may affect the legal analysis, a legal conclusion or an 
informational confirmation in the Opinion.‖). 
81 Day, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26149, at *8-*9. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at *9-*10. 
84 See id.   
85 Id. 
86 See id. *21-*22. 
87 See id. *21-*24. 
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liability, despite the fact that the letter did not specify which laws the client was 
potentially violating.88   
According to the court, ―the opinion letter contained express warnings to 
investors regarding the potential risks of their investment.‖89  Quoting another case, 
the court further stated that ―plaintiffs‘ reliance [is] unreasonable where the letter 
‗raise[s] more red flags about the investment than gives assurance . . . .‘‖90  
Considering ―the opinion letter‘s disclosures, plaintiffs‘ access to the relevant 
information [in the letter from the corporation‘s executive and the Form 10-K] and 
Day‘s ability, as legal representative, to negotiate affirmative assurances from 
defendants concerning [the corporation‘s] compliance[,] . . . plaintiffs‘ reliance was 
unreasonable as a matter of law.‖91 
Thus, as illustrated in Day, when issuing an opinion regarding law that is 
unclear or subject to change, a lawyer should state in the opinion that the law is 
unclear or subject to change.92  As an added precaution, this disclosure could be 
documented in other correspondence between the client and third party.  In Day, the 
opinion letter specifically provided that the corporation‘s games could be removed 
from casinos, and plaintiffs had a letter from the corporation and the corporation‘s 
Form 10-K that provided the same.93  The more sophisticated an opinion recipient, 
the more likely that a disclosure in the opinion will suffice to protect an opining 
attorney from liability: ―[I]n evaluating the reasonableness of plaintiffs‘ reliance, the 
Court asks not whether the representations would deceive the average person, but 
rather whether the representations would deceive ‗a person of the capacity and 
experience of the particular [plaintiff].‘‖94 
                                                 
88 Id. at *23. 
89 Id. at *24. 
90 Id. (quoting Nolte v. Pearson, 994 F.2d 1311, 1318 (8th Cir. 1993)). 
91 Id. 
92 This, of course, would comply with one of the first ―guidelines‖ in issuing third-party opinions—
not to mislead the recipient.  ―An opinion giver should not render an opinion that the opinion giver 
recognizes will mislead the recipient with regard to the matters addressed by the opinions given.‖ 
Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 876. 
93 See Day, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26149, at *10, *21-*22. 
94 Day, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26149, at *21 (quoting Berg v. Xerxes Southdale Office Bldg. Co., 290 
N.W.2d 612, 616 (Minn. 1980)); see also In re Infocure Securities Litigation, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1359 
(N.D. Ga. 2002) (―I see no compelling public policy justification for disregarding disclaimers in third 
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III.  DEFINITION OF SUBJECTIVE TERMS 
In addition to the scope of representation and the certainty of governing law, 
opining counsel should pay particular attention to the definition of subjective terms 
contained in their opinion letters.  This is especially true in opinions that do not 
adopt the Accord and, therefore, do not have a set of rules that guide 
interpretation.95  When the meaning of certain words or phrases is ambiguous, it is 
likely that different parties will interpret the words or phrases differently.96  When 
interpretations differ, litigation may follow.97  
A.  “To Our Knowledge” 
Perhaps the most common phrase in any document involving factual 
representations is ―to our knowledge.‖98  The phrase ―to our knowledge‖ is a 
standard limitation that restricts the breadth of the representation being made.99  
Instead of certifying that certain facts are true, a representation that includes the 
clause ―to our knowledge‖ simply states that the party making the representation 
does not know that certain facts are untrue.100  Although the ambiguity in this phrase 
is not readily apparent, a quick look at opinion letter case law reveals uncertainty in 
application.101  One of the main areas of uncertainty involves the degree of 
investigation required before making a representation to one‘s knowledge.  Another 
concern involves the scope of knowledge that opining counsel is expected to 
possess.102   
                                                                                                                                     
party opinion letters in complex transactions involving sophisticated businessmen all of whom have 
their own independent counsel.‖). 
95 See supra text accompanying notes 66-70. 
96 The ABA acknowledged this in its promulgation of the Accord.  The ABA intended to produce a 
document that would prevent the frequent misunderstandings between parties over the interpretation 
of opinion letter provisions.  See supra text accompanying notes 66-70 (explaining the creation and 
adoption of the Accord). 
97 See infra Part III, A, B. 
98 See Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 879; Berman, supra note 14, at 20. 
99 See Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 879. 
100 See id. 
101 See generally Berman, supra note 14, at 20-22 (examining conflicting opinion letter case law). 
102 See Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 879; Berman, supra note 14, at 21-22. 
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The American Bar Association states in its Guidelines for the Preparation of 
Closing Opinions (―ABA Guidelines‖), created for opinions that do not adopt the 
Accord:103 
To avoid a possible misunderstanding over the meaning of 
―knowledge,‖ the opinion preparers should consider describing in the 
opinion letter the factual inquiry they have conducted (for example, 
by stating what they intend ―to our knowledge‖ to mean or by 
indicating that they are rendering the opinion based solely on their 
personal knowledge without making any inquiry).104 
Dean Foods Co. v. Pappathanasi105 illustrates that even a definition of ―to our 
knowledge‖ in the opinion letter may not fully protect opining counsel. 
 In Dean Foods, a law firm and three attorneys were sued for negligence, 
negligent misrepresentation, and violation of a Massachusetts unfair practices act in 
connection with a third-party opinion letter.106  The plaintiff had contracted to buy 
stock in a holding company that held all of the stock of the firm‘s client.107  As a 
condition to consummation of the stock purchase, the defendant issued the plaintiff 
a ―no litigation‖ opinion (i.e., an opinion stating that the firm‘s client was not 
threatened by any pending or potential litigation).108  The opinion at issue 
represented:  
To our knowledge, except as set forth in Schedule 2.10 of the 
Company Disclosure Schedule, there is no claim, action, suit, 
litigation, proceeding, arbitration or, [sic] investigation of any kind, at 
law or in equity (including actions or proceedings seeking injunctive 
relief), pending or threatened against the Company or any of its 
subsidiaries and neither the Company nor any of its subsidiaries is 
subject to any continuing order of, consent decree, settlement 
agreement or other similar written agreement with, or continuing 
                                                 
103 Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 875. 
104 Id. at 878. 
105 No. Civ. A. 01-2595 BLS, 2004 WL 301944 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2004). 
106 Id. at *11. 
107 Id. at *6.  Although the plaintiff in this case is really a group of ―corporately related‖ entities, for 
the purposes of the case, all function together as a single company.  Id. at *1. 
108 Id. at *7. 
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investigation by, any Governmental Entity, or any judgment, order, 
writ, injunction, decree or award of any Governmental Entity or 
arbitrator, including, without limitation, cease-and-desist or other 
orders.109 
In defining ―to our knowledge,‖ the opinion letter stated:  
With respect to matters stated to be ‗to our knowledge,‘ we call your 
attention to the fact that we have not made any independent review 
or investigation of agreements (other than those expressly referred to 
herein), instruments, orders, writs, judgments, rules, regulations or 
decrees by which our clients or any of their properties may be bound, 
nor have we made any investigations as to the existence of actions, 
suits, investigations or proceedings, if any, pending or threatened 
against our clients, except to the extent that any of the above is 
disclosed in any exhibit or schedule to the Purchase Agreement.  
However, nothing has come to our attention which causes us to 
doubt the accuracy of such exhibits or schedules.110 
The firm further stated in the opinion letter that ―[i]n rendering our opinions we 
have examined such materials as we have deemed relevant to those opinions . . . .‖111  
When the firm issued the opinion, the firm knew that its client‘s records had been 
subpoenaed by a grand jury in connection with a case involving the client‘s rebate 
program.112  The firm also knew that the Assistant U.S. Attorney was investigating 
the legality of the client‘s rebate program.113  Nowhere in Schedule 2.10 or in any 
other schedule or exhibit to the agreement did the firm disclose the grand jury 
subpoena or rebate investigation.114 
Three years after the opinion letter was issued, the firm‘s client pled guilty to 
conspiracy to commit tax evasion in connection with its rebate program.115  The plea 
                                                 
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Id. 
112 Id. at *1,*8,*10. 
113 Id. at *2, *9-*10. 
114 Id. at *8; see id. at *10. 
115 Id. at *10. 
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resulted in a fine of over seven million dollars.116  The plaintiff sued the firm and 
attorneys involved for the misrepresentations in the opinion, arguing that it would 
not have purchased stock in the client‘s company had it known of the grand jury 
subpoena and rebate investigation.117  Although the firm‘s defense was not entirely 
clear, one of the litigators in the firm asserted that he did not accurately comprehend 
what matters needed to be included in the opinion and that he was unaware the firm 
was issuing an opinion letter regarding the client‘s criminal liability.118  Although the 
court absolved the attorneys of individual liability, the court held the firm liable for 
both common negligence and negligent misrepresentation.119 
The court began its analysis of the case by exploring the meaning of third-
party opinions in general.120  Quoting § 95(1) of the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers, the court declared: ―In furtherance of the objectives of a client 
in representation, a lawyer may provide to a nonclient the results of the lawyer‘s 
investigation and analysis of facts or the lawyer‘s professional evaluation or opinion 
on the matter.‖121  The court also quoted § 95(3), which states: ―[i]n providing the 
information, evaluation, or opinion under Subsection (1), the lawyer must exercise 
care with respect to the nonclient . . . .‖122  The court then looked at the customary 
standard of care.123  A court dealing with an opinion that adopted the Accord 
probably would not need to look at customary practice to interpret meaning,124 but 
the court here was forced to examine other sources to determine the breadth of the 
third-party opinion in general and the no-litigation opinion in particular.125 
Quoting the widely read and highly respected TriBar Opinion Committee 
report, Third Party “Closing” Opinions (―TriBar Report‖), the court stated that ―[f]actual 
information that is the subject of an opinion (e.g., no litigation) . . . must be 
                                                 
116 Id.  
117 Id. at *10. 
118 Id. at *9. 
119 Id. at *23. 
120 See id. at *11. 
121 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95(1) (1998)). 
122 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95(3) (1998)). 
123 Id. at *12. 
124 See supra text accompanying notes 66-70 (explaining that adoption of the Accord means that an 
opinion will be subject to a defined list of assumptions, limitations, and interpretations). 
125 Dean Foods Co., 2004 WL 3019442, at *12. 
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established in a way that meets the needs of the parties to the transaction.‖126  After 
explaining that an opinion giver must use judgment in determining whether the 
opinion conforms to customary practice of the locale, the court made it clear that the 
opinion giver has an underlying responsibility to refrain from misleading the 
recipient.127  Quoting the TriBar Report, the court explained:  
 When considering if an opinion to be given will mislead the opinion 
recipient, opinion preparers must think not only about the opinion 
itself but also about areas excluded from the opinion. . . . Inclusion of 
the phrase ‗to our knowledge‘ in an opinion does not by itself . . . 
state a limitation on the investigation required by customary 
diligence.‖128 
The court again quoted TriBar Report, stating: 
The no litigation opinion is intended to elicit information regarding 
the existence of pending and threatened actions and proceedings . . . 
that might be of concern to the opinion recipient. . . . The presence 
or absence of the phrase ‗to our knowledge‘ does not change the 
meaning of the opinion.  With or without ‗to our knowledge,‘ the 
opinion does nothing more than provide comfort to the opinion 
recipient that the opinion preparers do not know the list of litigation 
referred to in the opinion letter to be incomplete or unreliable.129 
The court found that the phrase ―to our knowledge‖ represents that the 
opinion is accurate as to the knowledge of all of the lawyers in the firm, not just the 
lawyers who actually prepared the opinion.130  Responding to the defendants‘ 
argument that the opinion was not prepared by the same group of lawyers who 
handled the client‘s litigation matters, the court stated that ―[a]n opinion letter is 
usually written on a law firm‘s letterhead and signed in the name of the firm.  It thus 
                                                 
126 Id. at *13 (quoting TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 598). 
127 Id.; see supra note 99 (explaining that honesty is the best policy). 
128 Id. (quoting TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 602, 619). 
129 Id. at *14 (quoting TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 664). 
130 Id. at *13. 
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purports to express the opinion of the firm, not merely that of the opinion 
preparers.‖131  Additionally, the court stated:  
The no-litigation opinion is based on the assumption that the opinion 
giver has a special awareness of pending or threatened actions, a 
special ability to verify their existence or nonexistence through client 
records, or special ability to ask the right questions of the appropriate 
people to determine that the certificate provided by the officers of 
the company includes and appropriately describes all pending 
actions.132 
Significantly, it was of no consequence that the defendants did not believe 
the grand jury subpoena and rebate investigation would result in criminal 
prosecution.133  The court also again referenced the TriBar Report, holding that any 
possible or pending actions should be disclosed in the no litigation opinion.134  The 
court explained that these matters must be included even if presumably closed: 
There is a dramatic difference in asking a lawyer . . . whether he 
thinks a grand jury investigation has gone away, and asking him 
whether his law firm can decline to reveal the grand jury investigation 
in an opinion letter that confirms the absence of pending or 
threatened investigations, while being embroidered with the nothing-
has-come-to-our-attention-which-causes-us-to-doubt-the-accuracy-
thereof language.135 
Of course, the use of the phrase ―nothing has come to our attention which 
causes us to doubt the accuracy of such exhibits or schedules‖ made the court‘s 
analysis easier.136  This phrase makes the defendants‘ representation that they did not 
know of any pending investigation much more explicit.  As stated by the court:  
In its Opinion Letter . . . [the law firm] not only failed to list in 
Schedule 2.10 the . . . grand jury subpoena/rebate investigation, it went 
                                                 
131 Id. (citing TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 605). 
132 Id. at *14. 
133 See id. at *8 (stating that one defendant-lawyer‘s ―guesstimate[d]‖ that the matter had gone away). 
134 See supra text accompanying note 129. 
135 Dean Foods Co., 2004 WL 3019442, at *17. 
136 See supra text accompanying note 110. 
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a significant step further when it affirmatively said: ―nothing has 
come to our attention which causes us to doubt the accuracy 
thereof.‖  These words—―nothing has come to our attention which 
causes us to doubt the accuracy thereof‖—appear in the Opinion 
Letter not just once, but twice.137 
 It is probable, however, that the absence of this phrase would not have 
affected the end result of firm liability for common negligence and negligent 
misrepresentation.  After all, opinion givers have a general obligation not to mislead 
opinion recipients,138 especially in no litigation opinions, which represent that there is 
no undisclosed pending or threatened claim, action, suit, litigation, proceeding, 
arbitration, or investigation.139  By issuing a no litigation opinion, a firm represents 
that it does not know of any litigation and implicitly represents that it does not know 
of any facts that might indicate possible litigation. 
Examining the court‘s analysis in Dean Foods, there are several lessons for 
lawyers who make factual representations in opinion letters.  The primary lesson is 
that the phrase ―to our knowledge,‖ no matter how defined, cannot transform the 
meaning of a representation.140  Because an opinion letter should not mislead the 
opinion recipient, the use of ―to our knowledge‖ will not free opining counsel from 
liability for issuing an opinion that it had reason to know was not true.141   
Another lesson found in Dean Foods is rather simple, but very important: if an 
opinion letter is signed by a firm, the opinion is considered to be issued by the entire 
firm and not just the lawyers who participated in drafting the opinion.142  ―To our 
knowledge‖ in a firm-issued opinion means ―to the knowledge of all the lawyers in 
this firm.‖143  If a firm represents a client in several different capacities, lawyers 
drafting the opinion letter for the client should verify with other lawyers working for 
the client that the opinion letter is accurate.144  ―There is no absolute requirement 
                                                 
137 Id. at *18. 
138 See supra text accompanying note 130. 
139 See supra text accompanying note 133. 
140 See supra text accompanying notes 130-33. 
141 See Dean Foods Co., 2004 WL 3019442, at *13. 
142 See supra text accompanying notes 134-35. 
143 See id. 
144 See Dean Foods Co., 2004 WL 3019442, at *13.  
90 TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 10 
 
 
that every lawyer be consulted and every file reviewed.  Informal consultations will 
satisfy the due diligence inquiry, provided that the opinion preparer talks to the 
appropriate people.‖145  The ability of opining counsel to lessen this duty of ―due 
diligence inquiry‖ is another question for which Dean Foods has an intriguing answer. 
Interestingly (and perhaps disturbingly), Dean Foods can be read to mean that 
opinion preparers are always subject to duties imposed by customary diligence and 
that the phrase ―to our knowledge‖ cannot limit those duties.  If this is true, despite 
any explanation of the meaning of ―knowledge‖ in the opinion, ―to our knowledge‖ 
may not ever be completely defined within the four corners of an opinion letter.  
The American Bar Association instructs opining counsel to define the meaning of 
―to our knowledge‖ as used in an opinion,146 but Dean Foods suggests that part of its 
meaning may be dictated by customary practice beyond the express definition.147  
Thus, use of the phrase ―to our knowledge‖ may bind opining counsel to the 
phrase‘s customary meaning, even when the opinion provides otherwise.   
The Dean Foods court essentially stated that a firm making a factual 
representation in an opinion letter has a customary duty to investigate the accuracy 
of the representation as to all the lawyers within the firm, regardless of which 
attorneys drafted the opinion, notwithstanding the ―to our knowledge‖ limitation.148   
Understanding the facts of Dean Foods and the court‘s analysis, the court‘s 
ruling that ―to our knowledge‖ does not limit the investigation required by 
customary practice is probably not as broad as it seems.  Although Dean Foods could 
be read to mean that a ―to our knowledge‖ limitation does not limit those duties 
imposed by customary practice, Dean Foods probably means that ―to our knowledge‖ 
cannot implicitly abrogate those obligations required by customary practice.  When a 
firm does not state whether it has investigated pursuant to customary diligence, the 
firm will be held to the standard of customary diligence; on the other hand, when a 
firm explicitly states that it did not complete the investigation required by customary 
diligence, the firm probably would not be held to that standard.  It is unlikely that the 
Dean Foods court would find a firm liable if (1) the firm explicitly provided in the 
opinion letter that its representations were limited to the knowledge of the actual 
                                                 
145 Berman, supra note 14, at 22. 
146 See supra text accompanying note 111. 
147 See supra text accompanying note 104. 
148 See Dean Foods Co., 2004 WL 3019442, at *13. 
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preparers and (2) the preparers did not possess actual knowledge concerning any 
investigations.149 
Dean Foods also teaches that required matters must be disclosed in an opinion 
even if opining counsel thinks that the matters will be resolved.150  The obligation to 
disclose certain matters to a third-party recipient remains even when opining counsel 
believes disclosure is unimportant.151  Moreover, as evidenced by the facts of Dean 
Foods, it may be hard to tell which matters are important.  Undoubtedly, the court‘s 
analysis of this issue was aided by the fact that an expert witness testified that it was 
below a lawyer‘s standard of care to think that such matters were closed. 
Dean Foods is also fascinating because the firm actually advised its client to 
disclose the existence of the grand jury subpoena and rebate investigation in the 
opinion letter.152  The client, however, decided against including the matters in the 
opinion letter, fearful that disclosure would lead to interference with the stock 
purchase by minority shareholders.153  In addition to the more analytical points 
provided by this case, there is also a common sense tip:  when a client desires to 
exclude a matter from an opinion letter because of fear that disclosure will kill the 
deal, counsel should know that that is the sort of matter that must be included. 
Although Dean Foods is an unreported state court decision, its reasoning is based 
on the TriBar Report, one of the premier sources of authority on third party 
opinions.154  Thus, what could otherwise be considered an irrelevant decision offers 
invaluable insight into how other courts would handle these issues.      
                                                 
149 This point is especially compelling due to the sophistication of the opinion recipients.  See supra 
notes 101 and accompanying text.  In some situations, however, there may still be an argument that an 
opinion letter by its nature imposes some duties that cannot be abrogated.  According to the D.C. 
Circuit Court, ―[u]nder the securities laws, a statement of opinion includes an implied representation 
that the speaker rendered the opinion in good faith and with a reasonable basis.  Good faith alone is 
not enough.  An opinion must have a reasonable basis, and there can be no reasonable basis for an 
opinion without a reasonable investigation into the facts underlying the opinion.‖  Michael Sackheim, 
Selected Ethical and Professional Responsibility Issues, 1642 PRAC. L. INST.: CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE 
HANDBOOK SERIES 129, 149 (2008) (citing Weiss v. SEC, 468 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
150 See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.  See infra Part IV.B. for an extended discussion on an 
opinion giver‘s duty to disclose. 
151 See Dean Foods Co., 2004 WL 3019442, at *17. 
152 Id. at *8. 
153 Id.  
154 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Other Subjective Terms 
As previously discussed, in a ―no litigation‖ opinion, opining counsel 
represents that there is no threatened litigation.  Often, however, there is confusion 
as to what constitutes a ―threat‖ of litigation.  Additionally, in a ―no litigation‖ 
opinion, opining counsel frequently provides that no threatened litigation exists that 
could have a ―material adverse effect‖ on the client or the transaction.  Often there is 
confusion as to what is considered ―material.‖  
In In re Infocure Securities Litigation,155 the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant 
law firm did not disclose a threat of litigation in violation of the firm‘s ―no litigation‖ 
opinion.156  Plaintiffs claimed that a third party sent a letter threatening litigation 
against the firm‘s client, creating a matter that required disclosure in the ―no 
litigation‖ opinion.157  The district court, however, considered the letter to be a 
demand letter and stated that a demand letter was not a ―threat‖ of litigation.158  A 
demand letter is defined as ―[a] letter by which one party explains its legal position in 
a dispute and requests that the recipient take some action (such as paying money 
owed), or else risk being sued.‖159  The court pointed out that the letter in this case 
contained only a demand and did not contain any express threat of future 
litigation.160  Moreover, the third party who sent the letter testified at trial that he 
had, in fact, agreed to cooperate with the client and did not threaten litigation by his 
letter.161 
The court in In re Infocure Securities Litigation did not explain why a demand 
letter did not constitute a threat of litigation despite the fact that demand letters are 
                                                 
155 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2002).  See supra notes 74-77 for an earlier discussion of Infocure 
Securities. 
156 Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1360. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. (―Moreover, a fair reading of the December 21, 1999, letter from Hafner‘s counsel is that it was 
a demand letter, not a threat of litigation.‖). 
159 BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 462-63 (8th ed. 2004). 
160 Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (―Although Hafner‘s attorney demands the registration of 
his client‘s shares in accordance with the Registration Rights Agreement, he makes no threat of 
litigation in the December 21, 1999, letter.‖). 
161 Id. (―[The law firm] was expressly told and understood from the Infocure executives who were in 
direct contact with Hafner, that he had acquiesced in the delay in registration of his shares, and that 
he was not threatening litigation.‖). 
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typically sent to ask the recipient to resolve a dispute ―or else risk being sued.‖162  
Rather, the court merely distinguished between a demand letter and a threat of 
litigation without explaining the distinction.163  The court‘s readiness to find a 
demand letter not a threat of litigation hinged on the peculiar facts of that case.  
Despite the general nature of demand letters, the demand letter at issue never 
mentioned litigation, and the sender admitted that he agreed to the client‘s actions 
and was not threatening litigation.164 
The court‘s quick dismissal of a ―demand letter‖ as not a threat of litigation 
fails to provide guidance for a case in which a demand letter actually contains 
language expressly or implicitly discussing potential litigation, particularly when the 
client is unable or unwilling to comply with the letter‘s demands.  Uncertainty also 
exists in cases where the person who sent the letter testifies at trial that he intended 
the letter to serve as a threat of litigation.  To avoid uncertainty over a court‘s 
definition of a ―threat‖ of litigation in different circumstances, opining counsel 
should define what constitutes a ―threat‖ and specify what qualities a communication 
must possess in order for it qualify.165  
The most obvious way opining counsel can restrict the breadth of the term 
―threat‖ is to provide that only written threats must be disclosed.166  The opinion 
letter at issue in In re Infocure Securities Litigation, having adopted the Accord, contained 
such a provision.167  The Accord provides that only written threats must be disclosed 
in a ―no litigation‖ opinion.168  According to the Accord, ―[b]ecause it is so often 
difficult to judge whether oral communications regarding disputes constitute actual 
threats of legal proceedings, the confirmation in the Opinion Letter relates only to 
legal proceedings that have been overtly threatened by a written communication.‖169  
                                                 
162 See supra text accompanying note 159. 
163 See supra note 158. 
164 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text. 
165 The ―no litigation‖ opinion at issue in In re Infocure Securities appears to use ―Threatened‖ as a 
defined term.  See Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.   
166 See id. at 1360 (stating that only written threats must be disclosed under the language of the ―no 
litigation‖ opinion). 
167 See id. at 1361 (―The ABA Accord clearly limits the confirmation of the threatened litigation to 
written communications.‖); see supra note 75 and accompanying text (explaining that the opinion letter 
adopted the Accord). 
168 Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1361. 
169 Id. (quoting Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 10, at 213). 
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Therefore, it is good practice to include a similar provision in ―no litigation‖ 
opinions that do not adopt the Accord. 
Similarly, opining counsel may limit what constitutes a threat to specifically 
defined language.  To help prevent a claim like that in In re Infocure Securities Litigation, 
opining counsel should provide that a threat does not exist unless there is an express 
(as opposed to implicit) warning of litigation.  Opining counsel should clearly state 
that a threat of litigation is an explicit warning of a suit, arbitration, action, claim, 
complaint, grievance, investigation, or proceeding if certain action is not taken or if 
certain action continues.  This approach is similar to the Accord, which provides that 
a threat of litigation in a ―no litigation‖ opinion refers only to those ―legal 
proceedings overtly threatened by a written communication.‖170  The opinion letter 
at issue in In re Infocure Securities Litigation adopted the Accord and, thus, provided that 
only overt threats could constitute a ―threat‖ within the meaning of the opinion 
letter.171  While such a provision did not prevent litigation, it prevented the court 
from ruling against the firm.  Although it may not be worth the extra time and 
expense in every situation, the more specifically the word ―threat‖ is defined, the 
more certain opining counsel will be as to its interpretation.  After In re Infocure 
Securities Litigation, opining counsel should consider expressly stating that a demand 
letter does not constitute a threat of litigation. 
In addition to the word ―threat,‖ disagreements often arise concerning the 
definition of ―material.‖  ―No litigation‖ opinions often state that pending or 
threatened litigation must be disclosed only if it could have a ―material adverse 
effect‖ or result in a ―material impairment‖ to the parties or the transaction.172  When 
the word ―material‖ is used by multiple parties to a transaction, each party probably 
has its own idea as to what is, in fact, material. 
Black‘s Law Dictionary defines ―material‖ as ―[o]f such a nature that 
knowledge of the item would affect a person‘s decision-making; significant; 
essential.‖173  The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538 states that a matter is material 
if:  
                                                 
170 Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 8, at 213. 
171 See Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1359. 
172 See, e.g., id.; Nat‘l Bank of Can. v. Hale & Dorr, LLP, No. 2000-00296, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 
142, at *5-*6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2004). 
173 BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (8th ed. 2004). 
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(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or 
nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in 
question; or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason 
to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as 
important in determining his choice of action, although a reasonable 
man would not so regard it.174 
In some situations, the materiality of an adverse effect or impairment would be 
beyond question.  For example, a billion dollar judgment against a party will probably 
always be considered to have a material adverse effect or cause a material 
impairment.  A thousand dollar judgment could be material, however, if it affected a 
contract central to a business‘s operations.  Non-monetary judgments could be 
considered material if they resulted in bad press for a corporation.  Reasonable 
minds could easily differ as to what constitutes ―material.‖   
In National Bank of Canada v. Hale & Dorr, LLP,* four banks who lent money 
to a firm‘s client sued the firm after receiving and relying on the firm‘s opinion 
letter.175  Alleging negligent misrepresentation, negligence, misrepresentation, breach 
of contract, and violation of a Massachusetts state statute, the banks claimed that the 
firm failed to disclose pending litigation involving its client as required by the firm‘s 
―no litigation‖ opinion.176  The ―no litigation‖ opinion at issue stated: 
To our knowledge, there is no action, suit, proceeding or 
investigation pending or threatened against [our client] before any 
court or governmental department, which could prevent the 
consummation of the transactions contemplated . . . or which, if 
adversely determined, could have a material adverse effect on the 
business, condition, affairs or operations of [our client] or any 
material impairment of the right or ability of [our client] to carry on 
its operations as now conducted.177 
When the firm issued its opinion, lawyers in the firm‘s litigation practice group knew 
of a patent infringement suit against the client.178 
                                                 
174 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977). 
175 Nat’l Bank of Can., 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 142, at *1.   
176 Id. at *1, *9-*10. 
177 Id. at *5-*6. 
178 Id. at *4. 
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The firm argued that its failure to disclose the patent infringement suit did 
not violate the ―no litigation‖ opinion because the suit would not have a material 
adverse effect on its client even if adversely determined.179  A lawyer in the defendant 
firm argued that, because the client was already using technology that did not involve 
the patent at issue, an injunction prohibiting use of the patent would have little effect 
on its client.180  The banks countered that the loan would have involved significantly 
different terms or would not have been completed had they known about the patent 
infringement litigation.181  Because a genuine issue of fact existed concerning the 
likelihood of a material adverse effect resulting from the patent litigation, the banks‘ 
claim of misrepresentation survived summary judgment.182 
Because of the subjectivity involved in the interpretation of ―material,‖ the 
Accord provides that materiality should be defined using monetary amounts.183  It 
states: ―[i]n order to avoid the uncertainties inherent in the meaning of materiality, it 
is desirable, whenever possible, to limit confirmations regarding pending or 
threatened legal proceedings seeking money damages to those exceeding an objective 
monetary or other threshold.‖184  For opinions that do not adopt the Accord, the 
ABA Guidelines provide assistance.185  They state that ―[w]hen possible, an opinion 
giver should avoid use of a materiality standard by using objective criteria (for 
example, a particular dollar amount, a specific category, or inclusion on a specified 
list) when limiting the matters addressed by an opinion.‖186  ABA reports and 
relevant case law suggest that opining counsel should refrain from using the word 
―material‖ in its opinions.  If opining counsel chooses to include the word, it should 
be defined using objective criteria.  Although a party cannot use monetary thresholds 
as objective criteria when determining whether litigation involving equitable relief 
must be disclosed,187 some objective criteria should be used.  For example, the firm 
in National Bank of Canada could have provided that only legal proceedings involving 
                                                 
179 Id. at *25. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at *25-*26. 
182 Id. at *26-*27. 
183 Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 8, at 213. 
184 Id.  It further states that ―[t]his sort of limitation would not, of course, apply to legal proceedings 
seeking equitable relief or otherwise to interfere with the Transaction.‖  Id. 
185 See Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 878. 
186 Id. 
187 See supra note 184. 
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more than $1 million or potentially enjoining its client from using currently 
employed technology could be considered to have a material adverse effect on its 
client. 
IV.  DUTY TO THIRD-PARTY RECIPIENT 
One of the most important issues surrounding third-party opinions is 
whether opining counsel owes a duty to the third-party recipient.188  Much of the 
case law and secondary authority concerning third-party opinions directly or 
indirectly address this question.189  For many claims, a duty to third-party recipients is 
a prerequisite to finding lawyer liability.190  If opining counsel can successfully argue 
that it does not owe a duty to third-party recipients, it may escape liability for what 
would otherwise be a faulty opinion.191  In examining the potential liability associated 
with issuing an opinion, opining counsel needs to determine what duties it may owe 
to recipients.   
Generally, third-party recipients claim that they are owed both the duty of 
care and the duty of disclosure.192  A duty of care imposes an obligation to ―exercise 
the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar 
circumstances.‖193  A duty of disclosure requires lawyers to reveal information to a 
third-party recipient when necessary to avoid misrepresentations caused by 
omissions.194  All negligence claims, including negligent misrepresentation, require 
                                                 
188 See supra text accompanying notes 29-30 (discussing two Massachusetts trial courts that addressed 
similar cases in the same year and resolved them differently).  See also Berman, supra note 14, at 20. 
189 See, e.g., In re Infocure Securities Litigation, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1351-54 (N.D. Ga. 2002); 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. 
1992); Nat‘l Bank of Can. v. Hale & Dorr, LLP, No. 2000000296, 2004 WL 1049072, *14-*23 (Mass. 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2004); MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.3 (1983); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (1998). 
190 See, e.g., Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1351-54 (showing that securities fraud claims require a 
duty of disclosure to be owed to plaintiff); Nat’l Bank of Can., 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 142, at *14-
*23 (claims involving negligence require that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care). 
191 See Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1351-54; Nat’l Bank of Can., 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 142, 
at *14-*23. 
192 See, e.g., Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1351-54; Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 605 N.E.2d at 320; 
Nat’l Bank of Can., 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 142, at *14-*23.     
193 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52. 
194 See Infocure Securities, 210 F.Supp. 2d at 1350. 
98 TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 10 
 
 
plaintiffs to show that they are owed a duty of care by the defendants.195  Negligence 
claims comprise a large percentage of the total claims against lawyers in opinion 
letter litigation.196  Fraud claims, including fraudulent misrepresentation, often 
require plaintiffs to show that they are owed a duty of disclosure by the 
defendants.197  A third-party recipient who cannot show that opining counsel owed a 
duty of care or disclosure may find it difficult to convince the court of liability.198  
A.  Duty of Care 
Section 95 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
provides:   
(1) In furtherance of the objectives of a client in a representation, a 
lawyer may provide to a nonclient the results of the lawyer‘s 
investigation and analysis of facts or the lawyer‘s professional 
evaluation or opinion on the matter. 
*** 
(3) In providing the information, evaluation, or opinion under 
Subsection (1), the lawyer must exercise care with respect to the 
nonclient to the extent stated in § 51(2) and not make false 
statements . . . .199 
                                                 
195 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 71 (2008).  
196 Although Infocure Securities did not involve a negligence claim, it did contain a legal malpractice 
claim, which (like a negligence claim) requires the plaintiff to prove a duty of care owed by the 
defendant.  See Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-70. 
197 See Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1351-54 (requiring a duty to disclose in a securities fraud 
claim); Freightliner, L.L.C. v. Whatley Contract Carriers, L.L.C., 932 So. 2d 883, 891 (Ala. 2005) 
(requiring a duty to disclose in a fraudulent suppression claim); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
551 (requiring a duty to disclose in a misrepresentation claim); 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 24 
(2008) (requiring a duty to disclose in a constructive fraud claim).  
198 Third-party recipients can assert claims other than those based on negligence, and not every fraud 
or misrepresentation claim requires a plaintiff to show the duty of disclosure.  See Nat’l Bank of Can., 
2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 142, at *23-*24 (not listing duty to disclose as an element of 
misrepresentation under Massachusetts law).  Because many cases regarding opinion letters involve 
negligence, and many fraud and misrepresentation claims frequently require plaintiffs to show a duty 
to disclose, the inability of third-party recipients to show a duty of care or disclosure significantly 
lessens the ability to prevail against opining counsel. 
199 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95. 
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Section 51(2) of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers provides 
that a lawyer owes a duty of care ―to a nonclient when and to the extent that[ ] the 
lawyer or (with the lawyer‘s acquiescence) the lawyer‘s client invites the nonclient to 
rely on the lawyer‘s opinion or provision of other legal services, and the nonclient so 
relies . . . .‖200  Section 552(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states:  
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, 
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, 
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business 
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them 
by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to 
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or 
communicating the information.201 
 With such strong and clear language from the Restatement, many courts are 
imposing a duty of care upon lawyers who issue third-party opinions.202  In the Dean 
Foods case discussed in Part III, the court used the TriBar Report in addition to the 
Restatement to support its holding that ―a professional duty is owed by the third-
party opinion giver to the opinion recipient.‖203  The TriBar Report states that a 
―third-party opinion recipient is entitled to rely only on what is stated in the opinion 
letter,‖204 and that the ―recipient‘s ‗right to rely‘ means that a professional duty is 
owed by opining counsel to the opinion recipient.‖205  The TriBar Report goes on to 
say that, ―[a]s a result, in most jurisdictions, if the opinion is negligently given and 
results in damage to the opinion recipient, the opinion recipient has a claim against 
the opinion giver.‖206 
 Despite the Restatement, TriBar Report, and much of the case law, not all 
courts impose a duty of care.207  As noted in the TriBar Report, ―[a] few jurisdictions 
                                                 
200 Id. at § 51(2). 
201 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). 
202 See Berman, supra note 14, at 21-22; Del O‘Roark, The Bermuda Triangle of Lawyer-Client-Nonclient, 59 
KBA BENCH & BAR 32, 32-33 (1995), available at http://www.lmick.com/pdfs/bbfall95.pdf.  
203 Dean Foods Co., 2004 WL 3019442, at *12 (quoting TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 2, at 604 
n.29). 
204 TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 604. 
205 Id. at 604 n.29. 
206 Id. 
207 See infra text accompanying note 222. 
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take the position that a professional cannot owe a duty to a non-client and, thus, that 
a third-party opinion recipient has no standing to sue the opinion giver.‖208  In 
National Bank of Canada v. Hale & Dorr, LLP, a trial court decision discussed in Part 
III, the court ruled that ―‗an attorney has no duty to a nonclient where the nonclient 
has potentially conflicting interests with that of the attorney‘s client.‘‖209  The court 
in National Bank of Canada expounded by stating that ―‗[t]he court will not impose a 
duty of reasonable care on an attorney if such an independent duty would potentially 
conflict with the duty the attorney owes to his or her client.‘‖210 
 The plaintiff-banks in National Bank of Canada claimed opining counsel was 
liable for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, misrepresentation, breach of 
contract, and violation of a state statute due to an allegedly false statement in a ―no 
litigation‖ opinion.211  Both the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims 
were disallowed, however, because the banks could not prove that the defendant 
firm owed any duty of care.212  Acknowledging Section 552(1) of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, which provides that a professional may be liable for negligently 
supplying false information for the guidance of others,213 the court nonetheless stated 
that a negligence action can only be sustained where the professional owes a duty of 
care to the recipient of the false information.214  The court found that the defendant 
could not owe a duty to the banks because the interests of the banks and the 
defendant‘s client conflicted.215  The firm‘s client: 
                                                 
208 TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 604 n.29. 
209 Nat‘l Bank of Can. v. Hale & Dorr, LLP, No. 2000000296, 2004 WL 1049072, *19-*20 (Mass. Sup. 
Ct. Apr. 28, 2004) (quoting McCormack v. Galego, No. CA 950837, 1996 WL 1312096, at *4 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1996)). 
210 Id. at *15 (citing Lamare v. Basbanes, 636 N.E.2d 218, 219 (Mass. 1994); DeLuca v. Jordan, 781 
N.E.2d 849, 857-58 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003); McCarthy v. Landry, 678 N.E.2d 172, 174 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1997)). 
211 Id. at *1. 
212 Id. at *13-*23. 
213 Section 552(1) provides: ―One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in 
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance 
of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for the pecuniary loss caused to them by 
their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in 
obtaining or communicating the information.‖  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). 
214 Nat’l Bank of Can., 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 142, *14-*16. 
215 Id. at *20-*21. 
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[W]as interested in acquiring money from the Banks and protecting 
its collateral; the Banks were interested in loaning money to [the 
client] and securing repayment of that debt.  Consequently, 
competing interests exist[ed], thereby negating any duty the 
Defendant would otherwise owe to the Banks as its non-clients with 
which it engaged in a business transaction.216 
According to the court, ―‗[i]t is well-established that attorneys owe no duty to their 
client‘s adversary.‘‖217 
 National Bank of Canada is striking because it was decided in the face of the 
Restatement, the TriBar Report, and existing opinion letter case law.  In 1992, the 
highest court of New York held that ―attorneys, like other professionals, may be held 
liable for economic injury [to third parties] arising from negligent representation,‖ 
despite attorneys‘ ethical obligations to their clients.218  The court explicitly stated 
that ―where . . . the negligent acts, i.e., the creation of an opinion letter and the 
transmission of that letter to a third party for the party‘s own use, were carried out 
by the lawyer at the client‘s express direction, . . . ethical considerations . . . are 
insufficient reason to insulate attorneys from liability.‖219  Thus, a decade before 
National Bank of Canada was decided, a court had already rejected client loyalty as 
reason to find no duty of care to third parties.   
 National Bank of Canada does not appear to have started a ―duty of care‖ 
revolution in opinion letter liability, and the trend of imposing a duty of care on 
opining counsel remains.220  In fact, just a few months after National Bank of Canada, 
a trial court in the same state held that opining counsel owes a duty of care to an 
opinion recipient because the recipient is entitled to rely on the opinion.221  National 
Bank of Canada still provides guidance, however, because it illustrates the reasoning 
                                                 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at *22 (quoting Lamare v. Basbanes, 636 N.E.2d 218, 219 (Mass. 1994)). 
218 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318, 320 
(N.Y. 1992). 
219 Id.  On a related note, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 2.3 discusses when a lawyer, for ethical 
reasons, should get her client‘s informed consent before issuing a third-party opinion.  MODEL RULES 
OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.3 (1983). 
220 Berman, supra note 14, at 22. 
221 See supra text accompanying note 30. 
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courts may find persuasive in deciding the existence of a duty of care and 
demonstrates that courts may still be open to persuasion on this issue. 
B.  Duty of Disclosure 
   Although not as common as cases involving duty of care,222 questions 
concerning the existence of a duty to disclose also arise in opinion letter litigation.223  
Plaintiffs who claim that omissions in an opinion letter fraudulently misled them 
generally have to prove that the issuing lawyer or firm had a duty to disclose the 
omitted information.224  The court in In re Infocure Securities Litigation held that a law 
firm did not have a duty to disclose omitted information to an opinion‘s third-party 
recipients because the firm had no fiduciary obligation to a nonclient.225   
Stating that ―[a law firm] can be liable for omissions . . . only if it had a duty 
to disclose,‖ the court listed seven factors in determining whether an opinion giver 
has a duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5.226  The factors are: 
(1) ―[T]he relationship‖ between the parties; (2) their ―relative access 
to the information‖ at issue; (3) ―the benefit derived by the 
defendant‖ from the transaction; (4) the ―defendant‘s awareness of 
[p]laintiff‘s reliance‖ on defendant in making its investment decision; 
(5) ―the extent of the defendant‘s knowledge,‖ (6) ―the significance‖ 
of the omitted information; and (7) ―the extent of the defendant‘s 
participation in the fraud.‖227   
Considering that the ―[p]laintiffs [in this case] were represented by their own counsel 
who had direct access to [the firm‘s client]‖ and that ―[t]heir counsel could have 
asked any questions they wished about any of the information involved,‖ the court 
determined that the factors did not impose a duty of disclosure on the law firm.228  
Similar to the reasoning in National Bank of Canada, the court stated that ―[n]o 
                                                 
222 See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
223 See In re Infocure Securities Litigation, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1351-54 (N.D. Ga. 2002). 
224 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
225 Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1351. 
226 Id.  Rule 10b-5 is 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 and provides required elements for securities fraud.  Id. at 
1348. 
227 Id. at 1351 (quoting Ziemba v. Cascade Int‘l Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1206 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
228 Id. 
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attorney[-]client relationship existed between [the law firm] and Plaintiffs‖ and that 
―[w]ithout a fiduciary obligation, it can hardly be said that the attorney for one party 
owes a duty to the opposing party, who was represented by competent lawyers of his 
own choice.‖229 
In re Infocure Securities Litigation sheds some light on the factors a court will 
consider when determining the existence of a duty of disclosure to opinion 
recipients.  Due to the number of factors in this test, however, there could be many 
different results.  For example, if an omission was unusually significant, a third-party 
recipient may be owed a duty of disclosure even when represented by counsel.230  
Likewise, firms may not owe a duty of disclosure to an unrepresented party when 
such party is sophisticated and has personal access to the relevant information.231  
Similar to the duty of care, it would be difficult to definitively state the law 
surrounding the duty of disclosure.  This Part merely attempts to show the reasoning 
behind a court‘s decision and how lawyers may use this reasoning to protect 
themselves from liability. 
CONCLUSION 
 An exploration into opinion letter liability is a long, dark, and confusing path.  
Relatively little case law or scholarly research exists, and the premier authorities 
consist mainly of bar association reports and Restatements.  Moreover, much of the 
existing case law is unpublished and sometimes contradictory, providing lawyers little 
guidance about precedent or the likely application of various rules.  This Article 
sought to analyze the relevant secondary authority and available case law as best 
possible in order to provide a few warning signs for opining counsel drafting their 
opinions. 
Because a lawyer will generally not be held liable for an improper opinion 
that was not within her scope of representation, defining the scope of an opinion 
letter is fundamental.232  The next important step in avoiding liability is ensuring that 
opinion recipients are aware if the subject law is unclear or likely to change.233  In 
addition, opining counsel should either avoid the use of subjective language apt to 
                                                 
229 Id. 
230 See supra text accompanying note 226 (listing factors). 
231 Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1351. 
232 See supra Part I. 
233 See supra Part II. 
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lead to litigation over interpretation or define such subjective language specifically.234  
Finally, lawyers may be able to avoid liability by realizing what duties they owe to 
third-party recipients and studying the arguments in favor of finding that no duty 
exists.235  
There is more research to be done and many more cases to be litigated on 
this issue.  Hopefully, this Article provides enough insight into opinion letter liability 
to allow a few opining counsel to sleep a bit more comfortably tonight.  When they 
wake up, we can remind them that ―we have only scratched the surface.‖236  
                                                 
234 See supra Part III. 
235 See supra Part IV. 
236 Lipson, supra note 2, at 126. 
